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Abstract
Humans rely heavily on shape information to recognize objects. Conversely, convolu-
tional neural networks (CNNs) are biased more towards texture. This is perhaps the main
reason why CNNs are vulnerable to adversarial examples. Here, we explore how shape bias
can be incorporated into CNNs to improve their robustness. Two algorithms are proposed,
based on the observation that edges are invariant to moderate imperceptible perturbations.
In the first one, a classifier is adversarially trained on images with the edge map as an ad-
ditional channel. At inference time, the edge map is recomputed and concatenated to the
image. In the second algorithm, a conditional GAN is trained to translate the edge maps,
from clean and/or perturbed images, into clean images. Inference is done over the gener-
ated image corresponding to the input’s edge map. Extensive experiments over 10 datasets
demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithms against FGSM and `∞ PGD-40 at-
tacks. Further, we show that a) edge information can also benefit other adversarial training
methods, and b) CNNs trained on edge-augmented inputs are more robust against natural
image corruptions such as motion blur, impulse noise and JPEG compression, than CNNs
trained solely on RGB images. From a broader perspective, our study suggests that CNNs do
not adequately account for image structures that are crucial for robustness. Code is available
at: https://github.com/aliborji/Shapedefence.git.
Keywords— Adversarial robustness, Adversarial defense, Adversarial attack, object recog-
nition, deep learning
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks [24, 26] remain state of the art across many areas and have a wide range of
application. They are also believed to be decent models of biological neural networks, in particular
in visual processing [23]. Despite unprecedented success, however, they can be easily fooled by
small input perturbations [40, 16] posing serious threats in using them in safety- and security-
critical domains. Intensive efforts are currently ongoing to remedy this problem.
The goal here is to learn robust models for visual recognition inspired by the observation that
shape and form, made of edges and object boundaries, remain largely invariant to imperceptible
adversarial perturbations (Fig. 1). Shape is the signature of an object and plays a vital role in recog-
nition [5]. We rely heavily on shape information, whereas CNNs emphasize more on texture [14]
(Appx. A). This explains why adversarial examples are perplexing.
The convolution operation in CNNs is biased towards capturing texture, since the number
of pixels constituting texture far exceeds the number of pixels that fall on the object boundary.
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This in turn provides a big opportunity for adversarial image manipulation. Some attempts have
been made to emphasize more on edges, for example by utilizing normalization layers (e.g., con-
trast and divisive normalization [25]). Such attempts, however, have not been fully investigated
for adversarial defense. Overall, how shape and texture should be combined and reconciled in
CNNs continues to be an open question. Here we propose two solutions that can be easily imple-
mented and integrated in existing defenses. We also investigate possible adaptive attacks against
them. Extensive experiments across ten datasets, over which shape and texture have different
relative importance, demonstrate the effectiveness of our solutions against strong attacks. Our
first method performs adversarial training on edge-augmented inputs. The second method uses
a conditional GAN [21] to translate the input’s edge map to a clean image, essentially finding a
perturbation-invariant transformation. There is no need for adversarial training (and hence less
computation) in this method. Further, and perhaps less surprising, we find that incorporating
edges also makes CNNs more robust to natural images corruptions. Ultimately, our study shows
that shape is the key to build robust models and opens a new direction for future research in
adversarial robustness.
2 Related works
Here, we provide a brief overview of the closely related research with an emphasis on adversarial
defenses. For a detailed review on the topic, please consult [1].
Adversarial attacks. The goal of the adversary is to craft an adversarial input x˜ ∈ Rd by adding
an imperceptible perturbation e to the (legitimate) input x ∈ Rd, i.e., x˜ = x+ e. Here, we consider
two attacks based on the `∞-norm of e, the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [16], as well as
the Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) method [30]. Both white-box and black-box attacks in the
untargeted condition are considered. It has been shown that deep models are also susceptible to
image transformations other than adversarial attacks (e.g., noise and blur). See for example [19]
and [3].
Adversarial defenses. Recently, there has been a surge of methods to mitigate the threat from
adversarial attacks either by making models robust to perturbations or by detecting and reject-
ing malicious inputs. A popular defense is adversarial training in which a network is trained on
adversarial examples [40, 16]. In particular, adversarial training with a PGD adversary remains
empirically robust to this day [2]. Drawbacks of adversarial training include impacting clean per-
formance, being computationally expensive, and overfitting to the attacks it is trained on. Some
defenses, such as Feature Squeezing [46], Feature Denoising [45], PixelDefend [36], JPEG Com-
pression [11] and Input Transformation [17], attempt to purify the maliciously perturbed images
by transforming them back towards the distribution seen during training. MagNet [31] trains a
reformer network (one or multiple auto-encoders) to move adversarial images closer to the mani-
fold of legitimate images. Likewise, Defense-GAN [34] uses GANs [15] to project samples onto the
manifold of the generator before classifying them. A similar approach based on Variational Au-
toEncoders (VAE) is proposed in [28]. Unlike these works which are based on texture (and hence
are fragile [2]), our GAN-based defense is built upon edge maps. Some defenses are inspired by
biology (e.g., [8], [29], [38], [41]).
Shape vs. texture. [14] discovered that CNNs routinely latch on to the object texture, whereas
humans pay more attention to shape. When presented with stimuli with conflicting cues, for
instance a cat with elephant skin texture (Appx. A), human subjects correctly labeled them based
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Figure 1: Adversarial attacks against ResNet152 over the giant panda image using 4 promi-
nent attack types: FGSM [16] and PGD-40 [30] (α=8/255) for different perturbation budgets
e ∈ {8, 16, 32, 64}, as well as DeepFool [32] and Carlini-Wagner [7]. Second column in each panel
shows the difference (L2) between the original image (not shown) and the adversarial one (values
shifted by 128 and clamped). For DF and CW, values are magnified 20x and then shifted. The
edge map (using the Canny edge detector) remains almost intact at small perturbations. Notice
that edges are better preserved for the PGD-40 attack. See Appx. A for results using the Sobel
edge detection method.
on their shape. In a sharp contrast, predictions made by CNNs were mostly based on the texture
(See also [20]). Similar results are reported by [4].
3 Proposed methods
Edge-guided Adversarial Training (EAT). The intuition here is that the edge map retains the
structure in the image and helps disambiguate the classification (See Fig. 1). In its simplest form
(Fig. 2.A; Algorithm 1), adversarial training is performed over the 2D (Gray + Edge) or 4D (RGB +
Edge) input (i.e., number of channels). In a slightly more complicated form (Fig. 2.B), first for each
input (clean or adversarial) the old edge map is replaced with the newly extracted one. The edge
map can be computed from the average of only image channels or all available channels (i.e., im-
age plus edge). The latter can sometimes improve the results, since the old edge map (although
perturbed; Fig. 8 and Appx. B) still contains unaltered shape structures. Then, adversarial training
is performed over the new input. The reason behind adversarial training with redetected edges
is to expose the network to possible image structure damage. The loss for training is a weighted
combination of loss over clean images and loss over adversarial images. At inference time, first
the edge map is computed and then classification is done over the edge-augmented input.
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Figure 2: Edge-guided adversarial training (EAT).
GAN-based Shape Defense (GSD). Here, first a conditional GAN is trained to map the edge im-
age, from clean or adversarial images, to its corresponding clean image. Any image translation
method (here Pix2pix by [21] using this code1) can be employed for this purpose. Next, a CNN
is trained over the generated images. At inference time, first the edge map is computed and then
classification is done over the generated image for this edge image. The intuition is that edge
map remains nearly the same over small perturbation budgets (See Appx. A). Notice that condi-
tional GAN can also be trained on perturbed images (similar to [34] and [28] or edge-augmented
perturbed images (similar to above). Please see Algorithm 2.
4 Experiments and results
4.1 Datasets and Models
The experiments are spread across 10 datasets covering a variety of stimulus types. Sample im-
ages from datasets are given in Fig. 3. Models are trained with cross entropy loss and Adam opti-
mizer [22] with batch size of 100, for 20 epochs over MNIST and FashionMNIST, 30 over DogVs-
Cat, and 10 over the remaining. Canny method [6] is used for edge detection over all datasets,
except DogBreeds for which Sobel is used. Edge detection parameters are separately adjusted for
each dataset. We did not carry out exhaustive hyperparameter search, since we are interested in
1https://github.com/mrzhu-cool/pix2pix-pytorch
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Algorithm 1 Edge-guided adversarial training (EAT) for T epochs, perturbation budget e, and loss bal-
ance ratio α, over a dataset of size M for a network fθ (performed in minibatches in practice). β ∈
{edge, img, imgedge} indicates network type and redetect train means edge redetection during training.
for t = 1 . . . T do
for i = 1 . . . M do
// perform adversarial attack (here FGSM and PGD attacks)
x˜i = clip(xi + e sign(∇x`( fθ(xi), yi)))
if β == imgedge & redetect train then
x˜i = detect edge(x˜i) // recompute and replace the edge map
end if
` = α `( fθ(xi), yi) + (1− α) `( fθ(x˜i), yi) // here α = 0.5
θ = θ −∇θ` // update model weights with some optimizer, e.g., Adam
end for
end for
additional benefits edges may bring rather than training best possible models.
The first two datasets include MNIST [27] and FashionMNIST [44]. A CNN with 2 convolution,
2 pooling, and 2 fc layers is trained. Each of these datasets contains 60K training images (resolution
28×28) and 6K test images over 10 classes. The third dataset, DogVsCat2 contains 18,085 training
and 8,204 test images. Images in this dataset are of varying dimensions. They are resized here
to 150×150 pixels to save computation. A CNN with 4 convolution, 4 pooling and 2 fc layers is
trained from scratch.
Over the remaining datasets, we finetune a pretrained ResNet18 [18], trained over ImageNet [9],
and normalize images using ImageNet mean and standard deviation.
The fourth dataset, CIFAR-10 [24], contains 50K training and 10K test images with resolution
of 32×32 which are resized here to 64×64 for better edge detection. The fifth dataset is DogBreeds
(see footnote). It contains 1,421 training and 356 test images at resolution 224×224 over 16 classes.
The sixth dataset is GTSRB [37] and icludes 39,209 and 1,2631 training and test images, respec-
tively, over 43 classes (resolution 64×64 pixels). The seventh dataset, Icons-50, includes 6,975
training and 3,025 test images over 50 classes [19]. The original image size is 120×120 which is
resized to 64×64. The eighth dataset, Sketch, contains 14K training and 6K test images over 250
classes. Images have size 1111×1111 and are resized to 64×64 in experiments [12].
The ninth and tenth datasets are derived from ImageNet3. The Imagenette2-160 dataset has
3,925 training and 9,469 test images (resolution 160×160) over 10 classes (tench, English springer,
cassette player, chain saw, church, French horn, garbage truck, gas pump, golf ball, and parachute). The
Tiny Imagenet dataset has 100K training images (resolution 64 × 64) and 10K validation images
(used here as the test set) over 200 classes.
2www.kaggle.com/c/dogs-vs-cats-redux-kernels-edition & www.kaggle.com/c/dog-breed-identification
3https://github.com/fastai/imagenette & https://tiny-imagenet.herokuapp.com/
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Algorithm 2 GAN-based shape defense (GSD)
// Training
1. Create a dataset of images X = {xi, yi}i=1···N including clean and/or perturbed images
2. Extract edge maps (ei) for all images in the dataset
3. Train a conditional GAN pg(x|e) to map edge image e to clean image x // here Pix2pix
4. Train a classifier pc(y|x) to map generated image x to class label y
// Inference
1. For input image x, clean or purturbed, first compute the edge image e
2. Then, compute pc(y|x′) where x′ is the generated image corresponding to e
SketchCIFAR10MNIST
Fashion
MNIST DogVsCat
Dog
Breeds Icons50
Tiny
ImageNetImagenetteGTSRB
(10)
(10)
(10) (16) (2) (43) (50) (250) (10) (200)
Figure 3: Sample images from the datasets. Numbers in parentheses denote the number of classes.
4.2 Results
4.2.1 Edge-guided Adversarial Training
Results over MNIST, FashionMNIST, CIFAR-10, and TinyImageNet are shown in Tables 1 to 4,
respectively. In these experiments, edge maps are computed only from the gray-level image (in
turn computed from image channels). Please refer to Appx. B for results over the remaining
datasets.
Interestingly, over FashionMNIST, models (Orig. model column) trained over the edge maps
are more resilient to adversarial attacks than models trained on gray-level images. Over MNIST
and FashionMNIST dasasets, robust models trained over edge maps perform better than gray-
level images (the last column). The trained models over clean images, however, perform better
using gray-level images than edge maps (first columns). Adversarial training with augmented
inputs improves the robustness significantly over both datasets, except the FGSM attack on the
FashionMNIST. Over the CIFAR-10 dataset, incorporating the edge map improves the robustness
by a large margin against the PGD-40 attack. At e = 32/255, the performance of the robust model
over clean and perturbed images has raised from (0.316, 0.056) to (0.776, 0.392). On average, the
robust model shows 64% improvement over the RGB model (last column in Table 3). Results when
using the Sobel edge detector instead of the Canny does not show a significant difference (Table 7
in Appx. B). Over the TinyImageNet dataset, as in CIFAR-10, classification using edge maps is
poor perhaps due to the background clutter. Nevertheless, incorporating edges improves the re-
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Table 1: Results (Top-1 acc) over MNIST. Best accuracy in each column is highlighted in bold. In
italics are the results of the substitute attack. Epsilon values are over 255. We used the `∞ variants
of FGSM and PGD.
Orig. model (natural training) Rob. model (8) Rob. model (32) Rob. model (64) Average
e 0/clean 8 32 64 0/clean 8 0/clean 32 0/clean 64 Rob. models
FGSM
Edge 0.964 0.925 0.586 0.059 0.973 0.954 0.970 0.892 0.964 0.776 0.921
Gray 0.973 0.947 0.717 0.162 0.976 0.955 0.977 0.892 0.970 0.745 0.919
Gray+Edge 0.972 0.941 0.664 0.089 0.976 0.958 0.977 0.902 0.972 0.782 0.928
Redetect ” 0.950 0.803 0.356 ” 0.962 (0.968) ” 0.919 (0.947) ” 0.843 (0.881) 0.941
Gray + Redetected Edge 0.974 0.950 0.970 0.771 0.968 0.228 0.810
Redetect ” 0.958 (0.966) ” 0.929 (0.947) ” 0.922 (0.925) 0.953
PGD-40
Edge 0.964 0.923 0.345 0.000 0.971 0.949 0.973 0.887 0.955 0.739 0.912
Gray 0.973 0.944 0.537 0.008 0.977 0.957 0.978 0.873 0.963 0.658 0.901
Gray+Edge 0.972 0.938 0.446 0.001 0.978 0.953 0.975 0.879 0.965 0.743 0.915
Redetect ” 0.950 0.741 0.116 ” 0.960 (0.967) ” 0.913 (0.948) ” 0.804 (0.908) 0.932
Gray + Redetected Edge 0.975 0.949 0.973 0.649 0.968 0.000 0.752
Redetect ” 0.958 (0.967) ” 0.945 (0.958) ” 0.939 (0.942) 0.960
Table 2: Results over the Fashion MNIST dataset.
Orig. model Rob. model (8) Rob. model (32) Rob. model (64) Average
e 0/clean 8 32 64 0/clean 8 0/clean 32 0/clean 64 Rob. models
FGSM
Edge 0.775 0.714 0.497 0.089 0.776 0.740 0.766 0.664 0.748 0.750 0.741
Gray 0.798 0.670 0.288 0.027 0.798 0.722 0.764 0.584 0.768 0.505 0.690
Gray+Edge 0.809 0.662 0.229 0.010 0.794 0.732 0.769 0.623 0.750 0.537 0.701
Redetect ” 0.691 0.326 0.053 ” 0.739 (0.761) ” 0.616 (0.660) ” 0.491 (0.496) 0.693
Gray + Redetected Edge 0.789 0.719 0.775 0.539 0.762 0.045 0.605
Redetect ” 0.739 (0.753) ” 0.664 (0.678) ” 0.611 (0.532) 0.721
PGD-40
Edge 0.775 0.711 0.370 0.002 0.783 0.744 0.769 0.661 0.743 0.574 0.712
Gray 0.798 0.659 0.133 0.000 0.792 0.713 0.760 0.515 0.734 0.324 0.640
Gray+Edge 0.809 0.647 0.100 0.000 0.794 0.726 0.765 0.608 0.744 0.568 0.701
Redetect ” 0.682 0.235 0.014 ” 0.734 (0.760) ” 0.629 (0.666) - 0.607 (0.426) 0.712
Gray + Redetected Edge 0.800 0.717 0.779 0.393 0.771 0.002 0.577
Redetect ” 0.743 (0.766) ” 0.694 (0.681) ” 0.690 (0.504) 0.746
sults. We expect even better results with more accurate edge detection algorithms (e.g., supervised
deep edge detectors). Over the 4 datasets, the final model (i.e., adversarial training using image
+ redetected edge, and edge redetection at inference time) leads to the best accuracy. Improve-
ment over the image is more pronounced at larger perturbations, in particular against the PGD-40
attack (as expected; Fig. 1).
Over the DogVsCat dataset, as in FashionMNIST, the model trained on the edge map is much
more robust than the image-only model (Table 8 in Appx. B). Over the DogBreeds dataset, utilizing
edges does not improve the results significantly (compared to the image model). The reason could
be that texture is more important than shape in this fine grained recognition task (Table 9 Appx.
B). Over GTSRB, Icons-50, and Sketch datasets, image+edge model results in higher robustness than
the image-only model, but leads to relatively less improvement compared to the edge-only model.
See Tables 11, 13, and 15. Over the Imagenette2-160 dataset (Table 17), classification using images
does better than edges since texture is very important on this dataset.
Average results over 10 datasets is presented in Fig. 4. Combining shape and texture (full
model) leads to a drastic improvement in robustness over the texture alone (5.24% imp. against
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Table 3: Results over the CIFAR-10 dataset.
Orig. model Rob. model (8) Rob. model (32) Average
e 0/clean 8 32 0/clean 8 0/clean 32 Rob. models
FGSM
Edge 0.490 0.060 0.015 0.535 0.323 0.382 0.199 0.360
RGB 0.887 0.359 0.246 0.869 0.668 0.855 0.553 0.736
RGB + Edge 0.860 0.366 0.169 0.846 0.611 0.815 0.442 0.679
Redetect ” 0.399 0.281 ” 0.569 (0.631) ” 0.417 (0.546) 0.662
RGB + Redetected Edge 0.846 0.530 0.832 0.337 0.636
Redetect ” 0.702 (0.753) ” 0.569 (0.678) 0.737
PGD-40
Edge 0.490 0.071 0.000 0.537 0.315 0.142 0.119 0.278
RGB 0.887 0.018 0.000 0.807 0.450 0.316 0.056 0.407
RGB + Edge 0.860 0.019 0.000 0.788 0.429 0.176 0.119 0.378
Redetect ” 0.306 0.093 ” 0.504 (0.646) ” 0.150 (0.170) 0.404
RGB + Redetected Edge 0.834 0.155 0.776 0.006 0.443
Redetect ” 0.661 (0.767) ” 0.392 (0.700) 0.666
Table 4: Results over the TinyImageNet dataset.
Orig. model Rob. model (8) Rob. model (32) Average
e 0/clean 8 32 0/clean 8 0/clean 32 Rob. models
FGSM
Edge 0.136 0.010 0.001 0.150 0.078 0.098 0.021 0.087
RGB 0.531 0.166 0.074 0.512 0.297 0.488 0.168 0.366
RGB + Edge 0.522 0.152 0.050 0.508 0.273 0.471 0.148 0.350
Redetect ” 0.171 0.081 ” 0.287 (0.356) ” 0.162 (0.266) 0.357
RGB + Redetected Edge 0.505 0.264 0.482 0.111 0.340
Redetect ” 0.305 (0.371) ” 0.171 (0.296) 0.366
PGD-40
Edge 0.136 0.007 0.000 0.148 0.077 0.039 0.014 0.069
RGB 0.531 0.019 0.000 0.392 0.150 0.191 0.019 0.188
RGB + Edge 0.522 0.008 0.000 0.402 0.131 0.157 0.003 0.173
Redetect ” 0.074 0.009 ” 0.198 (0.353) ” 0.019 (0.103) 0.194
RGB + Redetected Edge 0.425 0.072 0.328 0.005 0.208
Redetect ” 0.206 (0.380) ” 0.073 (0.279) 0.258
FGSM and 28.76% against PGD-40). Also, image+edge model is slightly more robust than the image-
only model. Computing the edge map from all image channels improves the results on some
datasets (e.g., GTSRB and Sketch) but hurts on some others (e.g., CIFAR-10) as shown in Appx.
B. Average accuracy of models under natural training (Orig. model column in tables) is shown in
Fig. 13 (Appx. C). Natural training with image+edge and redetect at inference time leads to enhanced
robustness with little to no harm to standard accuracy. Also, our results set a new record on ad-
versarial robustness on some of these datasets even without exhaustive parameter search (e.g., the
best robust accuracy on CIFAR-10 against PGD attacks is under 60%; See for example [47]).
Parameter α. By setting α = 0, the network will only be exposed to adversarial examples (Alg.
1), which is computationally more efficient. However, it results in lower accuracy and robustness
compared to when α = 0.5, which means exposing the network to both clean and adversarial im-
ages is important (See Table 19; Appx. D). Nevertheless, here again incorporating edges improves
the robustness significantly compared to the image-only case.
Substitute/black-box attack. Following [33], we trained substitute models to mimic the robust
models (with the same architecture but with RGB channels) using the cross entropy loss over
the logits of the two networks, for 5 epochs. The adversarial examples crafted for the substitute
networks were then fed to the robust networks. Results are shown in italics in Tables 1 to 4 (only
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Figure 4: Average results of the EAT defense over 10 datasets (last cols. in tables).
performed against the edge-redetect models). We find that this attack is not able to knock off the
robust models. Counter-intuitively, it even improves the accuracy in some cases. See also Appx.
E.
Why is this method working? The main reason is because the edge map acts a checksum, and
the network learns (through adversarial training) to rely more on the redetected edges when
other channels are misleading. This aligns with prior observations such as shortcut learning in
CNNs [13]. Also, our approach resembles adversarial patch or backdoor/trojan attacks where the
goal is to fool a classifier by forcing it to rely on irrelevant cues. Conversely, here we use this trick
to make a model more robust. Any adaptive attack against this defense has to alter the edges
which most likely will result in perceptible structural damages. See Figs. 8 & 11 in Appx. A.
4.2.2 GAN-based Shape defense
We trained the Pix2pix model for 10 epochs over MNIST and FashionMNIST, and for 100 epochs
over CIFAR-10 and Icons-50 datasets. Sample generated images are shown in Fig. 14 (Appx. F). A
CNN (same architecture as before) was trained for 10 epochs to classify the generated images.
Results are shown in Fig. 5. The model trained over the images generated by Pix2pix (solid
lines in the figure) is compared to the model trained over the original clean training set (denoted
by the dashed lines). Both models are tested over the clean and perturbed versions of original test
sets of the four datasets. Over MNIST and FashionMNIST dastsets, GSD performs on par with
the original model on clean test images. It is, however, much more robust than the original model
against the attacks. When we trained the Pix2pix over the edge maps from the perturbed images,
the new CNN models became even more robust (stars in Fig. 5; top panels). We expect even better
results with training over edge maps from both intact and perturbed images.
Over CIFAR-10 and Icons-50 datasets, generated images are poor. Consequently, GSD under-
performs the original model over the original clean images. Over the adversarial inputs, however,
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Figure 5: Results of the GAN-based shape defense (GSD).
GSD wins, especially at high perturbation budgets and against the PGD-40 attack. With better
edge detection and image generation methods (e.g., using perceptual loss), even better results are
expected.
Why is this method working? The main reason is that cGAN learns a function f that is invariant
to adversarial perturbations. Since the edge map is not completely invariant to (specially large)
perturbations, one has to train the cGAN on the augmented dataset composed of clean and per-
turbed images. One advantage of this approach is computational efficiency since there is no need
for adversarial training. Any adaptive attack against this defense has to fool the cGAN which is
perhaps not feasible since it will be noticed from the generated images (i.e., cGAN will fail to gen-
erate decent images). Compared to other adversarial defenses that utilize GANs (e.g., [34, 28]),
our approach relies less on texture. Also, our defense can be integrated with these defenses
(e.g., using both texture and edge).
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Table 5: Performance of edge-augmented FastAT and FreeAT adversarial defenses over clean and
perturbed images (See Appx. G for extended algorithms). FastAT is trained with the FGSM adver-
sary (e = 0.1 or e = 0.3) over MNIST and FashionMNIST datasets, and e = 8/255 over CIFAR-10).
FreeAT is trained over CIFAR-10 with e = 8/255 and 8 minibatch replays. CIFAR-10 results are
averaged over 3 runs (Appx. G). PGD attacks use 10 random restarts. The remaining settings and
parameters are the same as in [42].
MNIST (FastAT) Fashion MNIST (FastAT)
e 0.1 0.3 Avg. 0.1 0.3 Avg.
0 PGD-50 0 PGD-50 Acc. 0 PGD-50 0 PGD-50 Acc.
Edge 0.986 0.940 0.113 0.113 0.538 0.844 0.753 0.786 0.110 0.623
Image 0.991 0.955 0.985 0.877 0.952 0.835 0.696 0.641 0.000 0.543
Image+Edge 0.988 0.968 0.980 0.922 0.965 0.851 0.780 0.834 0.769 0.809
Redetect ” 0.977 ” 0.966 0.978 ” 0.823 ” 0.778 0.822
Image+Redet. 0.986 0.087 0.986 0.000 0.515 0.857 0.262 0.817 0.000 0.484
Redetect ” 0.984 ” 0.986 0.986 ” 0.855 ” 0.823 0.838
CIFAR-10 (FastAT) CIFAR-10 (FreeAT)
8/255 Avg. 8/255 Avg.
0 PGD-10 Acc. 0 PGD-10 Acc.
0.582 0.386 0.484 0.679 0.678 0.678
0.767 0.381 0.574 0.774 0.449 0.612
0.874 0.386 0.630 0.782 0.442 0.612
” 0.393 0.634 ” 0.448 0.615
0.866 0.074 0.470 0.777 0.451 0.614
” 0.416 0.641 ” 0.452 0.615
5 Fast & free adversarial training with shape defense
Here, we examine whether incoporating shape bias can empower other defenses, in particular
a) fast adversarial training by [42], dubbed FastAT, and free adversarial training by [35], dubbed
FreeAT. Wong et al. trained robust models using a much weaker and cheaper adversary to lower
the cost of adversarial training. They showed that adversarial training with the FGSM adversary
is as effective as PGD-based training. The key idea in Shafahi et al. ’s work is to simultaneously
update both the model parameters and image perturbations in one backward pass, rather than
using separate gradient computations at each update step. Please see also Appx. G.
The same CNN architectures as in Wong et al. are employed here. For FastAT, we trained three
models over MNIST (for 10 epochs), FashionMNIST (for 3 epochs), and CIFAR-10 (for 10 epochs
& early-stopping) datasets. For FreeAT, we trained models only over CIFAR-10 for 10 epochs.
Results are shown in Table 5. Using shape-based FastAT and over MNIST, robust accuracy
against PGD-50 grows from 95.5% (image-only model) to 98.4% (our full model) at e = 0.1 and
from 87.7% to 98.6% at e = 0.3, which are even higher than what is reported by Wong et al. (97.5%
at e = 0.1 and 88.8% at e = 0.3). Over FashionMNIST, the improvement is even more pronounced
(from 69.6% to 85.5% at e = 0.1 and from 0% to 82.3% at e = 0.3 ). Over clean images, our
full model outperforms other models in most of the cases. Over CIFAR-10 dataset, shape-based
extension of the defenses results in high accuracy over both clean and perturbed images (using
PGD-10 attack), compared to the image-only model. We expect similar improvements with the
classic PGD adversarial training. Overall, our analyses in this section suggest that exploiting
edges is not specific to the particular way we perform adversarial training (Algorithms 1&2), and
be extended to other defense methods (e.g., TRADES algorithm by [47]).
6 Robustness against natural distortions
Previous work has shown that ImageNet-trained CNNs generalise poorly over a wide range of
image distortions (e.g., [3, 10]). Our objective in this section is to study whether increasing shape
bias improves robustness against common image distortions just as it did over adversarial exam-
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Figure 6: Classification accuracy over naturally distorted images.
ples. Following [19], we systematically test how model accuracies degrade if images are corrupted
by 15 different types of distortions including brightness, contrast, defocus blur, elastic transform, fog,
frost, Gaussian noise, glass blur, impulse noise, JPEG compression, motion blur, pixelatation, shot noise,
snow, and zoom blur, at 5 levels of severity. Fig. 15 (Appx. H) shows sample images along with
their distortions.
We test the original models (trained naturally on clean training images) as well as the robust
models (trained adversarially using Algorithm 1) over the corrupted versions of test sets on three
datasets. Results are visualized in Fig. 6. See Appx. H for breakdown results on each dataset and
distortion.
Two conclusions are drawn. First, incorporating edge information in original models (and
hence increasing shape bias) improves robustness against common image distortions (solid curves
in Fig. 6; RGB+Egde > RGB or Edge). Improvement is more noticeable at larger distortions and
over datasets with less background clutter (e.g., Icons-50). This is in alignment with [14] where
they showed ResNet-50 trained on the Stylized-ImageNet dataset performs better than the vanilla
ResNet-50 on both clean and distorted images. Second, adversarially-trained models (in particular
those trained on RGB + Edge) are more robust to image distortions compared to original models.
In summary, incorporating edges and adversarial images leads to improved robustness against
natural image distortions, despite models not being trained on any of the distortions during training.
This in turn suggests that the proposed algorithms indeed rely more on shape than texture. This
is also supported by our finding that focusing on the foreground image region further enhances
the robustness (Please see Appx. I).
7 Discussion and outlook
Two algorithms were proposed to defend against adversarial attacks by utilizing shape bias dur-
ing training. To fool these defenses one has to perturb the image such that the new edge map is
significantly different from the old one while preserving image shape and geometry, which does
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not seem to be trivial at low perturbation budgets. Even though we did not perform an exhaus-
tive parameter search (model architecture, epochs, edge detection, GAN training, etc.), our results
are better than or on par with the state of the art in some cases (e.g., over MNIST and CIFAR
datasets). The proposed mechanisms are computationally efficient and excel with higher resolu-
tion images and low background clutter. They are also more effective against stronger attacks than
weaker ones since strong attacks perturb the image less while being more destructive (e.g., PGD
vs. FGSM; Fig. 1).
Future work should consider assessing these defenses against other adversarial attacks (e.g., sparse
attacks such as the one pixel attack [39], perturbing only the edge pixels, and attacks that manip-
ulate the image structure [43]), `p norms, and datasets. Shape defense can also be combined with
other defenses to produce robust models without a significant slowdown. Finally, there might be
other ways to incorporate shape-bias in CNNs, such as 1) augmenting the dataset with original
images and their edge maps, 2) overlaying texture from some objects onto some others similar
to [14], 3) increasing the intensity of the edge pixels compared to the texture pixels, and 4) design-
ing and using normalization layers (e.g., divisive normalization).
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A Illustration of shape importance in adversarial robustness
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Figure 7: As is in Fig. 1 in the main text but using the Sobel edge detector. As it can be seen edge
maps are almost invariant to adversarial perturbation.
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Figure 8: Illustration of adversarial perturbation over the image as well as its edge map. First row
in each panel shows the clean or adversarial image (under the FGSM attack). Second row shows
the perturbed edge map (i.e., the edge channel of the the 2D or 4D adversarial input). Third row
shows the redetected edge map from the attacked gray or rgb image (i.e., calculated only from the
image channels and excluding the edge map itself).
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Figure 9: Top) Adversarial example generated for the famous panda image using the FGSM at-
tack [16]. Bottom) Adversarial examples generated for AlexNet from [40]. (Left) is a correctly
predicted sample, (center) difference between correct image, and image predicted incorrectly mag-
nified by 10x (values shifted by 128 and clamped), (right) adversarial example (i.e., left image +
middle image). Even though the left and right images appear visually the same to humans, the
left images are correctly classified by a DNN classifier while the right images are misclassified as
“ostrich, Struthio camelus”. Notice that in all of these image the overall image structure and edges
are preserved.
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Figure 10: A) Classification of a standard ResNet-50 of (a) a texture image (elephant skin: only
texture cues); (b) a normal image of a cat (with both shape and texture cues), and (c) an image
with a texture-shape cue conflict, generated by style transfer between the first two images, B)
Accuracy and example stimuli for five different experiments without cue conflict, and C) Sample
images from the Stylized-ImageNet (SIN) dataset created by applying AdaIN style transfer to an
ImageNet image (left). Figure compiled from [14].
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Figure 11: An example visual illusion simultaneously depicting a portrait of a young lady or an
old lady. While fooling humans takes a lot of effort and special skills are needed, deep models
are much easier to be fooled. In this example, the artist has carefully added features to make the
portrait look like an old lady while the new additions will not negatively impact the look of the
young lady too much. For example, the right eyebrow of the old lady (marked in red below)
does not distort the ear of the young lady too much. See https://medium.com/@jonathan_hui/
adversarial-attacks-b58318bb497b for more details.
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Figure 12: Classification results based on shape vs. texture. The left most column shows the image
presented to a model. The second column in each row names the object from which the shape was
sampled. The third column names the object from which the texture silhouette was obtained.
Probabilities assigned to the object name in columns 2 and 3 are shown as percents below the
object label. The remaining five columns show the probabilities (as percents) produced by the
network for its top five classifications, ordered left to right in terms of probability. Correct shape
classifications in the top five are shaded in blue and correct texture classifications are shaded in
orange. Figure from [4].
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B Additional results for the Edge-augmented defense
Results of the shape defense (Algorithm 1 in the main text) over eight datasets. Tables with * in
their caption have contributed to Fig 4 in the main text. In some tables, results are computed when
the edge map is computed from all image channels, i.e., a gray-level image is first computed by
averaging the 4 image channels (RGB + edge map) and then a new edge map is derived.
Table 6: Results on CIFAR-10 dataset [edge map computed from 4 channels]
Orig. model Rob. model (8) Rob. model (32) Average
e 0/clean 8 32 0/clean 8 0/clean 32 Rob. models
FGSM
RGB+Edge 0.860 0.366 0.169 0.846 0.611 0.815 0.442 0.679
Redetect ” 0.415 0.280 ” 0.574 ” 0.416 0.663
Gray + Redetected Edge 0.848 0.547 0.835 0.351 0.645
Redetect ” 0.696 ” 0.553 0.733
PGD-40
RGB+Edge 0.860 0.000 0.789 0.431 0.179 0.135 0.384
Redetect ” 0.087 ” 0.501 ” 0.152 0.405
Gray + Redetected Edge 0.837 0.164 0.767 0.010 0.444
Redetect ” 0.648 ” 0.352 0.651
Table 7: Results on CIFAR dataset using Sobel edge detection [edge map computed from 4 channels]
Orig. model Rob. model (8) Rob. model (32) Average
e 0/clean 8 32 0/clean 8 0/clean 32 Rob. models
FGSM
Gray+Edge 0.876 0.331 0.207 0.856 0.613 0.829 0.469 0.692
Redetect ” 0.424 0.285 ” 0.645 ” 0.490 0.705
Gray + Redetected Edge 0.858 0.580 0.842 0.411 0.673
Redetect ” 0.685 ” 0.558 0.736
Table 8: Results on DogVsCat dataset [edge map computed from 4 channels] (*)
Orig. model Rob. model (8) Rob. model (32) Average
e 0/clean 8 32 0/clean 8 0/clean 32 Rob. models
FGSM
Edge 0.814 0.633 0.119 0.812 0.757 0.806 0.999 0.843
RGB 0.863 0.007 0.051 0.777 0.430 0.819 0.985 0.753
RGB+Edge 0.823 0.007 0.000 0.782 0.641 0.808 0.992 0.806
Redetect ” 0.043 0.002 ” 0.666 ” 0.986 0.810
Gray + Redetected Edge 0.829 0.615 0.812 0.853 0.778
Redetect ” 0.763 ” 0.998 0.850
PGD-40
Edge 0.814 0.624 0.018 0.820 0.770 0.763 0.681 0.758
RGB 0.863 0.000 0.000 0.769 0.384 0.500 0.500 0.538
RGB+Edge 0.823 0.000 0.000 0.785 0.689 0.816 0.496 0.696
Redetect ” 0.006 0.000 ” 0.744 ” 0.500 0.711
Gray + Redetected Edge 0.819 0.600 0.817 0.009 0.561
Redetect ” 0.760 ” 0.972 0.842
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Table 9: Results on DogBreeds dataset using Sobel edge detection [edge map computed from 4 channels]
(*)
Orig. model Rob. model (8) Rob. model (32) Average
e 0/clean 8 32 0/clean 8 0/clean 32 Rob. models
FGSM
Edge 0.750 0.006 0.031 0.506 0.101 0.413 0.073 0.273
RGB 0.865 0.256 0.140 0.823 0.595 0.829 0.449 0.674
RGB + Edge 0.888 0.225 0.098 0.862 0.534 0.820 0.385 0.650
Redetect ” 0.244 0.171 ” 0.455 ” 0.292 0.607
RGB + Redetected Edge 0.843 0.506 0.874 0.298 0.630
Redetect ” 0.618 ” 0.419 0.689
PGD-40
Edge 0.607 0.000 0.000 0.514 0.065 0.036 0.000 0.154
RGB 0.899 0.000 0.000 0.795 0.286 0.596 0.025 0.425
RGB + Edge 0.896 0.000 0.000 0.789 0.225 0.567 0.042 0.406
Redetect ” 0.008 0.000 ” 0.396 ” 0.065 0.454
RGB + Redetected Edge 0.772 0.028 0.677 0.000 0.369
Redetect ” 0.393 ” 0.149 0.498
Table 10: Results on DogBreeds dataset using Sobel edge detection [edge map computed from 3 channels]
Orig. model Rob. model (8) Rob. model (32) Average
e 0/clean 8 32 0/clean 8 0/clean 32 Rob. models
FGSM
RGB + Edge 0.888 0.177 0.073 0.882 0.455 0.812 0.261 0.602
Redetect ” 0.258 0.110 ” 0.502 ” 0.275 0.618
RGB + Redetected Edge 0.893 0.480 0.848 0.216 0.609
Redetect ” 0.626 ” 0.388 0.689
Table 11: Results on GTSRB dataset [edge map computed from 4 channels] (*)
Orig. model Rob. model (8) Rob. model (32) Average
e 0/clean 8 32 0/clean 8 0/clean 32 Rob. models
FGSM
Edge 0.938 0.683 0.315 0.947 0.863 0.946 0.701 0.864
RGB 0.955 0.464 0.322 0.902 0.607 0.896 0.562 0.742
RGB + Edge 0.951 0.624 0.382 0.940 0.842 0.943 0.686 0.853
Redetect ” 0.592 0.471 ” 0.743 ” 0.626 0.813
RGB + Redetected Edge 0.925 0.801 0.939 0.616 0.820
Redetect ” 0.844 ” 0.766 0.869
PGD-40
Edge 0.938 0.618 0.054 0.950 0.861 0.937 0.598 0.836
RGB 0.955 0.189 0.033 0.855 0.495 0.736 0.246 0.583
RGB + Edge 0.951 0.271 0.021 0.943 0.750 0.839 0.342 0.718
Redetect ” 0.526 0.251 ” 0.774 ” 0.514 0.767
RGB + Redetected Edge 0.929 0.505 0.893 0.134 0.615
Redetect ” 0.818 ” 0.557 0.799
Table 12: Results on GTSRB dataset [edge map computed from 3 channels]
Orig. model Rob. model (8) Rob. model (32) Average
e 0/clean 8 32 0/clean 8 0/clean 32 Rob. models
FGSM
RGB + Edge 0.951 0.624 0.382 0.940 0.842 0.943 0.686 0.853
Redetect ” 0.500 0.395 ” 0.558 ” 0.492 0.733
RGB + Redetected Edge 0.889 0.699 0.891 0.549 0.757
Redetect ” 0.610 ” 0.577 0.742
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Table 13: Results on Icons-50 dataset [edge map computed from 4 channels] (*)
Orig. model Rob. model (8) Rob. model (32) Average
e 0/clean 8 32 0/clean 8 0/clean 32 Rob. models
FGSM
Edge 0.883 0.545 0.210 0.904 0.771 0.889 0.594 0.789
RGB 0.930 0.495 0.433 0.772 0.789 0.836 0.720 0.779
RGB + Edge 0.929 0.569 0.433 0.829 0.818 0.844 0.745 0.809
Redetect ” 0.470 0.414 ” 0.730 ” 0.732 0.784
RGB + Redetected Edge 0.841 0.837 0.849 0.688 0.804
Redetect ” 0.817 ” 0.710 0.804
PGD-40
Edge 0.883 0.423 0.000 0.902 0.769 0.846 0.404 0.730
RGB 0.930 0.341 0.113 0.765 0.663 0.736 0.453 0.654
RGB + Edge 0.929 0.320 0.011 0.800 0.678 0.785 0.366 0.657
Redetect ” 0.416 0.248 ” 0.738 ” 0.660 0.746
RGB + Redetected Edge 0.838 0.644 0.824 0.097 0.601
Redetect ” 0.792 ” 0.539 0.748
Table 14: Results on Icons-50 dataset [edge map computed from 3 channels]
Orig. model Rob. model (8) Rob. model (32) Average
e 0/clean 8 32 0/clean 8 0/clean 32 Rob. models
FGSM
Gray+Edge 0.929 0.569 0.433 0.829 0.818 0.844 0.745 0.809
Redetect ” 0.520 0.460 ” 0.737 ” 0.731 0.785
Gray + Redetected Edge 0.831 0.788 0.870 0.725 0.804
Redetect ” 0.783 ” 0.765 0.812
Table 15: Results on Sketch dataset [edge map computed from 2 channels] (*)
Orig. model Rob. model (8) Rob. model (32) Average
e 0/clean 8 32 0/clean 8 0/clean 32 Rob. models
FGSM
Edge 0.479 0.167 0.041 0.502 0.343 0.483 0.216 0.386
Gray 0.532 0.109 0.021 0.530 0.278 0.474 0.144 0.356
Gray + Edge 0.486 0.097 0.019 0.513 0.286 0.440 0.167 0.352
Redetect ” 0.263 0.004 ” 0.355 ” 0.013 0.330
RGB + Redetected Edge 0.497 0.180 0.420 0.071 0.292
Redetect ” 0.416 ” 0.162 0.374
PGD-40
Edge 0.480 0.106 0.000 0.508 0.341 0.401 0.068 0.330
RGB 0.532 0.028 0.000 0.538 0.260 0.018 0.000 0.204
Gray + Edge 0.486 0.034 0.000 0.500 0.279 0.026 0.000 0.201
Redetect ” 0.277 0.024 ” 0.360 ” 0.004 0.223
Gray + Redetected Edge 0.502 0.121 0.448 0.000 0.268
Redetect ” 0.423 ” 0.212 0.396
Table 16: Results on Sketch dataset [edge map computed from 1 channel]
Orig. model Rob. model (8) Rob. model (32) Average
e 0/clean 8 32 0/clean 8 0/clean 32 Rob. models
FGSM
Gray + Edge 0.486 0.097 0.019 0.513 0.286 0.440 0.167 0.352
Redetect ” 0.213 0.005 ” 0.388 ” 0.022 0.341
Gray + Redetected Edge 0.519 0.296 0.445 0.191 0.363
Redetect ” 0.397 ” 0.020 0.345
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Table 17: Results on Imagenette2-160 dataset [edge map computed from 4 channels] (*)
Orig. model Rob. model (8) Rob. model (32) Average
e 0/clean 8 32 0/clean 8 0/clean 32 Rob. models
FGSM
Edge 0.780 0.101 0.436 0.781 0.520 0.664 0.245 0.553
RGB 0.969 0.617 0.409 0.959 0.827 0.946 0.710 0.860
RGB + Edge 0.959 0.613 0.373 0.951 0.801 0.935 0.643 0.832
Redetect ” 0.652 0.471 ” 0.812 ” 0.687 0.846
RGB + Redetected Edge 0.950 0.747 0.949 0.592 0.810
Redetect ” 0.834 ” 0.732 0.866
PGD-40
Edge 0.780 0.064 0.000 0.794 0.526 0.577 0.071 0.492
RGB 0.969 0.052 0.005 0.918 0.599 0.808 0.221 0.636
RGB + Edge 0.959 0.045 0.000 0.909 0.558 0.762 0.151 0.595
Redetect ” 0.445 0.069 ” 0.743 ” 0.305 0.680
RGB + Redetected Edge 0.944 0.246 0.883 0.046 0.530
Redetect ” 0.757 ” 0.432 0.754
Table 18: Results on Imagenette2-160 dataset [edge map computed from 3 channels]
Orig. model Rob. model (8) Rob. model (32) Average
e 0/clean 8 32 0/clean 8 0/clean 32 Rob. models
FGSM
RGB + Edge 0.959 0.613 0.373 0.951 0.801 0.935 0.643 0.833
Redetect ” 0.611 0.447 ” 0.802 ” 0.673 0.840
RGB + Redetected Edge 0.952 0.767 0.949 0.596 0.816
Redetect ” 0.832 ” 0.729 0.865
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Figure 13: Accuracy of models trained naturally over clean images (first columns in tables). Left)
Average over MNIST and Fashion MNIST datasets, Right) Average over all datasets. Results show
a clear advantage of using edges. Over MNIST and FashionMNIST, the model trained on edges
alone leads to a trade-off between accuracy and robustness. Image+edge model does worse than
the Image model but its performance is recovered after adversarial training (Please see also tables
in the main text and Appx. B and the explanation in the main text). Overall, incorporating edge
and image together and redetection at inference times leads to higher accuracy and robustness
(black curves).
27
D Analysis of parameter α in Alg. 1.
Table 19: Results (Top-1 acc) over MNIST corresponding to α = 0 (i.e., adversarial training only
on adversarial examples taking part in the loss function). See also Table 1 in the main text.
Rob. model (8) Rob. model (32) Rob. model (64) Average
e 0/clean 8 0/clean 32 0/clean 64 Rob. models
FGSM
Gray+Edge 0.963 0.938 0.959 0.869 0.931 0.684 0.891
Redetect ” 0.943 ” 0.887 ” 0.727 0.902
Gray + Redetected Edge 0.963 0.936 0.944 0.588 0.937 0.030 0.733
Redetect ” 0.948 ” 0.911 ” 0.916 0.937
PGD-40
Gray+Edge 0.966 0.940 0.960 0.859 0.928 0.607 0.877
Redetect ” 0.946 ” 0.883 ” 0.657 0.890
Gray + Redetected Edge 0.963 0.933 0.947 0.469 0.936 0.000 0.708
Redetect ” 0.946 ” 0.913 ” 0.915 0.937
Table 20: Results (Top-1 acc) over Fashion MNIST corresponding to α = 0 (i.e., adversarial training
only on adversarial examples taking part in the loss function). See also Table 2 in the main text.
Rob. model (8) Rob. model (32) Rob. model (64) Average
e 0/clean 8 0/clean 32 0/clean 64 Rob. models
FGSM
Gray+Edge 0.756 0.701 0.732 0.619 0.683 0.487 0.663
Redetect ” 0.707 ” 0.635 ” 0.481 0.666
Gray + Redetected Edge 0.768 0.705 0.739 0.481 0.693 0.040 0.571
Redetect ” 0.727 ” 0.660 ” 0.635 0.704
PGD-40
Gray+Edge 0.768 0.702 0.749 0.573 0.718 0.432 0.657
Redetect ” 0.714 ” 0.593 ” 0.510 0.675
Gray + Redetected Edge 0.778 0.702 0.762 0.414 0.750 0.001 0.568
Redetect ” 0.725 ” 0.632 ” 0.615 0.710
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E Results of the substitute black-box attack
Table 21: Results of the substitute attack against the robust models.
MNIST Fashion MNIST CIFAR TinyImgNet
e 8 32 64 8 32 64 8 32 8 32
FGSM
Img + edge model
Substitute model on clean images 0.94 0.9365 0.9314 0.7515 0.7393 0.7311 0.8079 0.7766 0.008 0.008
Substitute model on adversarial images 0.8941 0.5858 0.0992 0.6484 0.3701 0.0967 0.2716 0.2049 0.004 0.003
Robust model on clean images 0.9761 0.9766 0.9722 0.7939 0.7692 0.75 0.8463 0.8463 0.508 0.471
Robust model on adversarial images 0.9623 0.9189 0.842 0.7391 0.6156 0.4908 0.5695 0.4186 0.287 0.161
Robust model on substitute adv. images 0.9678 0.9472 0.8813 0.7609 0.6604 0.4955 0.6307 0.5463 0.356 0.266
Img + edge model (redetect)
Substitute model on clean images 0.9381 0.9335 0.9326 0.7513 0.7431 0.7388 0.8104 0.7966 0.008 0.008
Substitute model on adversarial images 0.89 0.5696 0.0989 0.6538 0.3663 0.08 0.2879 0.1988 0.004 0.002
Robust model on clean images 0.9742 0.9699 0.9681 0.7891 0.7746 0.7617 0.8456 0.8328 0.495 0.482
Robust model on adversarial images 0.9583 0.9283 0.9216 0.7392 0.664 0.6115 0.7032 0.5684 0.380 0.170
Robust model on substitute adv. images 0.9657 0.9469 0.9249 0.7529 0.6776 0.5318 0.7528 0.7528 0.371 0.296
PGD-40
Img + edge model
Substitute model on clean images 0.9391 0.9344 0.9257 0.7531 0.7408 0.7303 0.756 0.194 0.008 0.006
Substitute model on adv. images 0.8906 0.4455 0.0196 0.6473 0.2745 0.0096 0.020 0.003 0.000 0.000
Robust model on clean images 0.9782 0.9751 0.9654 0.7938 0.7652 0.7442 0.788 0.179 0.395 0.157
Robust model on adv. images 0.9599 0.9132 0.8039 0.7336 0.6289 0.6068 0.504 0.152 0.242 0.018
Robust model on substitute adv. images 0.9667 0.9477 0.9079 0.7603 0.6656 0.4263 0.646 0.170 0.352 0.103
Img + edge model (redetect)
Substitute model on clean images 0.9385 0.9363 0.9329 0.7503 0.7471 0.7415 0.804 0.730 0.008 0.008
Substitute model on adv. images 0.8888 0.4617 0.0211 0.6458 0.2687 0.01 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.000
Robust model on clean images 0.975 0.9732 0.9682 0.7998 0.7793 0.7715 0.834 0.766 0.425 0.328
Robust model on adv. images 0.9581 0.9449 0.9386 0.7435 0.6943 0.6902 0.662 0.375 0.206 0.074
Robust model on substitute adv. images 0.9665 0.9575 0.9417 0.7661 0.681 0.5037 0.767 0.700 0.380 0.279
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F Sample generated images by the conditional GAN in GAN-based
Shape Defense (GSD)
Figure 14: Top) GSD with a classifier trained on images generated (by Pix2pix) only from the
edge maps of the clean images, Bottom) GSD with edge maps derived from adversarial exam-
ples. Columns from left to right: adversarial images by the FGSM attack, their edge maps, and
generated images by Pix2pix.
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G Shape-based extensions of vanilla PGD adversarial training, free ad-
versarial training (FreeAT), and fast adversarial training (FastAT) al-
gorithms
Algorithm 3 Shape-based PGD adversarial training for T epochs, given some radius e, adversarial
step size α and N PGD steps and a dataset of size M for a network fθ . β ∈ {edge, img, imgedge}
indicates the net type and redetect train mean edge redetection during training.
for t = 1 . . . T do
for i = 1 . . . M do
// Perform PGD adversarial attack
δ = 0 // or randomly initialized
for j = 1 . . . N do
δ = δ+ α · sign(∇δ`( fθ(xi + δ), yi))
δ = max(min(δ, e),−e)
end for
x˜i = xi + δ
if redetect train & β == imgedge then
x˜i = detect edge(x˜i) // recompute and replace the edge map
end if
θ = θ −∇θ`( fθ(x˜i), yi) // Update model weights with some optimizer, e.g. SGD
end for
end for
31
Algorithm 4 Shape-based “Free” adversarial training for T epochs, given some radius e, N mini-
batch replays, and a dataset of size M for a network fθ . β ∈ {edge, img, imgedge} indicates the
net type and redetect train mean edge redetection during training.
δ = 0
// Iterate T/N times to account for minibatch replays and run for T total epochs
for t = 1 . . . T/N do
for i = 1 . . . M do
// Perform simultaneous FGSM adversarial attack and model weight updates T times
for j = 1 . . . N do
x˜i = xi + δ
if redetect train & β == imgedge then
x˜i = detect edge(x˜i) // recompute and replace the edge map
end if
// Compute gradients for perturbation and model weights simultaneously
∇δ,∇θ = ∇`( fθ(x˜i), yi)
δ = δ+ e · sign(∇δ)
δ = max(min(δ, e),−e)
θ = θ −∇θ // Update model weights with some optimizer, e.g. SGD
end for
end for
end for
Algorithm 5 Shape-based FGSM adversarial training for T epochs, given some radius e, N PGD
steps, step size α, and a dataset of size M for a network fθ . β ∈ {edge, img, imgedge} indicates the
net type and redetect train mean edge redetection during training.
for t = 1 . . . T do
for i = 1 . . . M do
// Perform FGSM adversarial attack
δ = Uniform(−e, e)
δ = δ+ α · sign(∇δ`( fθ(xi + δ), yi))
δ = max(min(δ, e),−e)
x˜i = xi + δ
if redetect train & β == imgedge then
x˜i = detect edge(x˜i) // recompute and replace the edge map
end if
θ = θ −∇θ`( fθ(x˜i), yi) // Update model weights with some optimizer, e.g. SGD
end for
end for
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Table 22: Performance of the Fast Adversarial Training (FastAT) method over three runs.
Run 1 Run 1 Run 1 Average
Model Clean PGD-10 Clean PGD-10 Clean PGD-10 Clean PGD-10
Edge 0.559 0.384 0.581 0.187 0.608 0.586 0.582 0.386
RGB 0.813 0.368 0.598 0.205 0.889 0.569 0.767 0.381
RGB + Edge 0.863 0.590 0.882 0.334 0.878 0.878 0.874 0.386
Redetect ” 0.593 ” 0.341 ” 0.245 ” 0.393
RGB + Redet. Edge 0.892 0.001 0.817 0.115 0.889 0.105 0.866 0.074
Redetect ” 0.265 ” 0.656 ” 0.326 ” 0.416
Table 23: Performance of the Free Adversarial Training (FreeAT) method over three runs.
Run 1 Run 1 Run 1 Average
Model Clean PGD-10 Clean PGD-10 Clean PGD-10 Clean PGD-10
Edge 0.674 0.672 0.704 0.702 0.660 0.659 0.679 0.678
RGB 0.783 0.450 0.768 0.450 0.772 0.447 0.774 0.449
RGB + Edge 0.784 0.432 0.779 0.447 0.782 0.448 0.782 0.442
Redetect ” 0.447 ” 0.448 ” 0.449 ” 0.448
RGB + Redet. Edge 0.776 0.451 0.776 0.454 0.780 0.447 0.777 0.451
Redetect ” 0.452 ” 0.456 ” 0.448 ” 0.452
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H Performance of the models against common image corruptions
Figure 15: Sample images alongside their corruptions with 5 severity levels.
34
Figure 16: Performance of models against natural image corruptions over the TinyImageNet
dataset.
35
Figure 17: Performance of models against natural image corruptions over the GTSRB dataset.
36
Figure 18: Performance of models against natural image corruptions over the Icons-50 dataset.
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I Effect of removing background perturbations
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Figure 19: Sample images with their foreground parts extracted. fg mask is derived from the input
image (pixels ¿ 0).
Table 24: Performance of the models (naturally trained and adversarially-trained) against the im-
ages with only foreground impacted/perturbed. Robust models are trained with perturbed im-
ages (all image pixels) at each e, and tested with that e after foregound subtraction. Compared
with the results in Table. 1, applying the models with the foreground regions improves the accu-
racy by a large margin.
FGSM PGD-40
e = 8 e = 32 e = 64 e = 8 e = 32 e = 64
Gray 0.9598 0.9021 0.7516 0.9598 0.8947 0.7042
RobustGray 0.9641 0.9237 0.8398 0.9636 0.9139 0.7868
Edge 0.9553 0.9199 0.8323 0.9553 0.9213 0.8452
RobustEdge 0.9686 0.9468 0.9059 0.9686 0.9474 0.9057
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